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1.  Introduction
UK skilled wages relative to unskilled wages fell more or less continuously from the end
of World War II to the late 1970s.  Since then they have risen very sharply: the rise in the last
twenty years has undone the fall over the previous thirty-five.  This sharp rise has been
associated with a range of issues that have risen to the top of the policy agenda: social
exclusion, poverty and unemployment.
The leading demand-side causes for these trends, international trade and technical change,
have been explored by a number of researchers (see Wood, 1998, for a recent summary).
Most studies do not find support for the trade hypothesis.  Desjonqueres, Machin, and Van
Reenen (1997) and Neven and Wyplosz (1996) analyse changes in U.K. product prices across
industries of different skill intensities.  Contrary to the intuition of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, these studies find no evidence that relative prices for unskilled-intensive products
fell during the 1980s.  As for technology, Machin (1996) and Machin and van Reenen (1998)
document the widespread occurrence of skill-biased technical change (SBTC) in a number of
industries or establishments over a number of countries; they also show that most economy-
wide skill-upgrading has occurred due to skill-upgrading within industries.  This evidence
suggests that SBTC may have contributed to the rising skill premium.
These studies are suggestive, but they face at least three important limitations.  First, in the
technology studies, the link between SBTC and relative wages is usually based on a one-
sector model, in which technical change must be factor-biased to affect relative wages.  But in
a multi-sector model the wage effects of technical change often depend on its sector bias, i.e.,
on what sectors enjoy the most technical progress, independent of any factor bias.
Furthermore, in a multi-sector model all kinds of technical change, factor-biased or factor-
neutral, can affect relative wages.  No U.K. study has considered all kinds of technical change
from this multi-sector perspective.1
                                                
1 The importance of sector bias is a well-established result in the multi-sector literature, see below for more discussion.  Its
intuition can be seen from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which works via the sector bias of product-price changes altering2
Second, the product-price studies have been only loosely linked to the Heckscher-Ohlin
(HO) trade framework they commonly invoke.  These studies regress changes in industry
product prices on the industry skilled/unskilled employment ratio.  This specification was
used in many early HO studies of U.S. wages, but, as later studies showed and as we show
below, it is misspecified relative to HO theory.  These results are therefore difficult to
interpret.
Third, all these studies assume that prices and technology are exogenous.  In linking price
changes with international trade, the price studies all assume, explicitly or implicitly, that
domestic prices change due to trade forces.  But, as Deardorff and Haikura (1994) and
Freeman (1995) have argued, evidence is required as to how much domestic-price variation is
caused by international trade, such as changes in trade barriers or changes in international
product prices.2  Similarly, one might reasonably ask what forces cause technical change.  For
example, Wood (1994) has conjectured that trade liberalisation induces technical change (in
which case the trade/technology distinction might be inappropriate).  Overall, knowing what
underlying forces are driving prices and technology may be extremely important for
understanding the consequence of policy, e.g., trade barriers or R&D incentives.
In this paper we address all these issues by using a single theoretical framework, the
production side of HO trade theory, to explore the role of trade and technology in changing
U.K. relative wages.  The core of this framework is a set of zero-profit conditions linking
domestic factor prices to product prices and technology in traded sectors where goods are
produced domestically.  These conditions help determine national factor demands and thus,
when combined with factor supplies, equilibrium factor prices.  Importantly, the effect on
                                                                                                                                                        
the relative profitability of sectors and so inducing wage changes to restore general equilibrium.  Likewise it is the sector bias
of technology changes that tends to alter sectoral profitability and so relative wages, a result dating back as far as Findlay and
Grubert (1959).  Haskel and Slaughter (1998) set out a model explaining the roles of sector bias versus factor bias and
analyse the sector bias of SBTC for the UK and other countries.  SBTC is of course only one type of technical change that
can change sectoral profits.
2 Freeman (1995, p. 29) writes:  "Perhaps the biggest problem with these studies is that they ignore potential determinants of
changes in sectoral prices and potential reasons for the proportion of unskilled workers in a sector to be correlated with
changes in prices, save for trade."  Using an approach different from this paper, Harrigan and Balaban (1997) instrument for
U.S. tradables prices using foreign labour endowments and trade flows.3
wages of changes in product prices and technology tends to depend on the sector bias of these
changes.  The reason is that any price or technology change which initially increases profits in
a particular sector tends to raise the economy-wide wage for factor(s) employed relatively
intensively in that sector until zero profits are restored in all sectors.
This theory implies an empirical specification in which a cross-section of changes in
sector product prices or total-factor productivity (TFP) are regressed on sector cost shares for
various factors of production.  We interpret the coefficient estimates on the cost shares as the
economy-wide wage changes “mandated” by the sector bias of changes in prices or TFP, i.e.,
wage changes which maintain zero profits in all sectors following changes in prices or
technology.  Estimates of these mandated wage changes can then be compared with actual
wage changes to see what share of actual changes can be accounted for by various trade and
technology forces.
To address the question of whether prices and technology are endogenous, we estimate
two sets of mandated-wage regressions based on two different sets of assumptions.  First, as a
benchmark, we assume that the United Kingdom is a small, open economy, implying that
changes in domestic prices are entirely due to international trade, and that TFP growth is
exogenous.  Here, we simply use price changes or TFP growth in the mandated-wage
regressions to estimate trade and technology’s wage effects.
Second, we assume that sector price changes and TFP growth are each caused by a set of
underlying forces.  We model U.K. prices as depending on U.K. import prices from various
country groups, and TFP as depending on technology and on product and labour market
competition.  In a first stage, we can calculate the contribution of each underlying force to
changes in prices or TFP.  In a second stage, we regress each of these contributions on sector
factor-cost shares.  The second-stage coefficients we interpret as wage changes mandated by
the sector bias of underlying forces working through changes product prices or TFP growth.
Among a number of results, we find that changes in prices, not TFP, were the major force
behind the rise in inequality in the 1980s.  We are the first study to find significant price4
effects on UK wage inequality.3  We also find that although increased pressure of trade has
affected technology, its effect on wage inequality was not statistically significant.
We believe that this paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on U.K. wage
inequality.  First, our work addresses all three concerns raised above in a unified framework.
Second, we obtain quantitative estimates of trade and technology’s wage impacts rather than
just qualitative evidence.4  Third, our study is the first to apply the mandated-wage
methodology to the U.K. case—in fact, the first we are aware of to apply it to a country other
than the United States. Fourth, most U.K. studies focus on the 1980s; we analyse the 1960s
and 1970s as well.
In addition to these contributions to existing research on the U.K. experience, we think our
study also contributes to the recent mandated-wage literature (see Slaughter (1999) for a
survey).  Only one other study has used the two-stage procedure.  Feenstra and Hanson (1998)
decompose the sum of US price changes and TFP into components attributable to computer
usage and to imported intermediate inputs.  We make three contributions to this two-stage
approach.  First, we are the first mandated-wage study to relate domestic prices to import
prices.  Second, our TFP decomposition uses a broader set of structural forces suggested by
the large industrial-organisation literature on causes of TFP.  Third, we are the first mandated-
wage study to consider empirically whether import competition induces technical change.5
The next section of the paper sets out our mandated wage framework.  In section 3 we
describe the data.  Section 4 presents our empirical work, and section 5 concludes.
                                                
3 Whilst this paper was being completed were we made aware of Gregory and Zissimos (1998) that uses the mandated wage
method for the 1980s.  Using input/output data and different skill divisions they also find significant price effects.  They do
not use a two-stage procedure as we do, nor do they provide evidence for earlier decades.
4For example, the finding that SBTC has been widespread does not indicate what share of overall inequality changes SBTC
accounts for.
5Our findings are consistent with a large literature explaining U.K. TFP.  For the role of unions see Metcalf (1989) and
Gregg, Machin and Metcalf (1993); for product-market competition see Haskel (1991) and Nickell (1996)).  See Lawrence
(1999) for an empirical analysis of U.S. TFP growth and foreign competition.5
2.  Mandated-Wage Methodology
Most researchers have analysed U.K. wage inequality in a supply-and-demand framework.
In deriving economy-wide labour demand, almost all U.K. studies have assumed a one-sector
economy.  In this case, firm-level relative labour demand aggregates straightforwardly, so that
national relative demand slopes downward in (relative quantity, relative wage) space.
We, too, use a supply-and-demand framework.  The key feature of our analysis, however,
is we assume there are many sectors, not just one.  Many fundamental ideas in trade theory
require multiple sectors, e.g., comparative advantage.  In addition, empirical work on SBTC
has documented its pervasiveness across many disaggregated sectors (e.g., Berman, Bound,
and Griliches, 1994).  It therefore seems appropriate to use a multi-sector model. 6
Why do multiple sectors matter?  Consider an increase in skilled-labour supply to the
economy.  In a one-sector model, the economy can absorb the extra skilled labour only
through wage changes.  But in a multi-sector model, sectoral outputs can change as well.  A
combination of higher output in the skill-intensive sector and lower output in the unskilled-
intensive sector can potentially absorb the rise in skilled supply (a Rybczynski effect).
Therefore, the economy-wide labour-demand curve, in a multi-sector model, reflects both
these output mix changes and relative wage changes.
2a.  Economy-Wide Relative Labour Demand in the HO Model
To derive the economy-wide relative labour demand schedule we need to explain how
relative labour-supply changes can be absorbed by changing output mixes.  To do this,
consider a country endowed with J distinct primary factors of production.  The country freely
trades with the rest of the world but has no influence on product prices.  Suppose there are a
large number, S, of tradable output sectors in the world.  The domestic decentralised
optimisation of all profit-maximising firms is equivalent to the country "choosing" the
                                                
6 We do not suggest, of course, that one-sector models are always inappropriate.  But it is always acknowledged that
compositional effects may be important in one sector/representative agent models.  Here composition effects are key.6
national output mix that maximises GNP subject to the constraints of world product prices,
national factor supplies, and national production technology (see, e.g., Dixit and Norman,
1980).  This optimal output mix consists of both which sectors are produced and production
quantities.
Let this decentralised process result in I different tradable goods that the country optimally
produces, each of which requires some combination of J primary factors and I intermediate
inputs.7  Then in each of the I sectors, perfect competition ensures zero profits, i.e., average
cost equals price.  For each sector i, we write zero-profit condition
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where pi
G
 is the domestic gross-output price in sector i; wj is the unit cost of the jth input; aji
is the employment of input j per unit of output in sector i; and bii is the amount of intermediate
input required to produce a unit of good i.  There are I equations in (1), one for each sector
where production occurs.  There are three points to note about (1).  First, for a small open
economy, pi
G is also the world price.  Second, because the HO framework assumes perfect
factor mobility across sectors, wages wj in (1) are not indexed by sector i.  Third, all aji and bii
are optimally chosen by profit-maximising firms and so depend on production technology and
(assuming substitutability in production) wages and prices.
The  I zero-profit conditions in (1) link domestic factor prices to product prices and
technology in all traded sectors with positive domestic production.  As national factor supplies
vary, so might the set of I products produced and thus the set of I zero-profit conditions in (1).
This suggests a way to derive national factor-demand schedules:  vary factor supplies, and use
these endowments plus the zero-profit conditions to trace out the labour demand curve.
                                                
7We omit imported intermediate inputs for notational simplicity.7
To make this derivation concrete, Figure 1 graphs the national relative factor demand
schedule for the case of two factors, skilled and unskilled labour, and three sectors:  an
unskilled-labour-intensive good, a "middle" factor-intensity good, and a skilled-labour-
intensive good (see also Leamer, 1998 and Wood, 1995 for a similar diagram).
Figure 1





Notes:  Skilled labour is subscripted "s" and unskilled labour "u".
Consider the leftmost downward-sloping branch, where the relative supply of skilled
labour is very low.  Given this endowment, the country maximises GNP by producing only
one product, the unskilled-labour-intensive good.  A relatively high quantity of unskilled
labour is demanded and since skilled labour is relatively scarce, it earns a high relative wage.
Now increase the relative supply of skilled labour,  but by a small enough amount that GNP is
still maximised by producing only the one product.  Since only one product is made, there is
no scope for Rybczynski effects and the one-sector intuition holds: to price themselves into
employment, skilled workers’ relative wages must fall.  The relevant zero profit condition in
this endowment range is8
pww su 1su  =  a  +  a 11 (1¢)
where subscripts s and u denote skilled and unskilled labour, respectively.  Note that in (1’)
there are two endogenously determined national wages, ws and wu, but only one equation
relating these wages to exogenous product prices and production technology.  Prices and
technology alone cannot determine wages, so endowments matter as well.
Now increase the supply of skilled labour until the first perfectly-elastic portion is
reached.  Here, the country maximises GNP by producing both the unskilled-labour-intensive
product and the middle product.  With two products there is now scope for Rybczynski
effects.  Additional skilled labour can be completely absorbed with no change in wages by
increasing output of the middle good and reducing output of the unskilled-intensive good.
This explains why RD has a flat portion where the same relative wage is consistent with a
range of quantities of relative labour demanded.  This result can be seen algebraically by
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In (1") there are two equations and two unknowns (ws and wu).  Hence ws and wu  are
completely determined by the prices (p1 and p2) and technology (the aji’s)8.  For any change in
supply wages do not change, so long as the country continues to make these two products.
This insensitivity of national wages to national factor supplies Leamer and Levinsohn (1995)
call the factor price insensitivity (FPI) theorem.9
                                                
8 With Leontief technology the aji’s are constants.  With substitutability, they depend on relative wages as well.  The algebra
is more involved, but the results still stands: the two wages are determined by the two output prices and technology
parameters.
9 Note that FPI assumes that the country is sufficiently small that changes in its relative-output mix do not change world
product prices.  If world prices do change than so, too, do domestic wages.  Below we discuss such price changes; for now,
note that a change in prices changes (1") and thus wages.9
The remaining portions of RD follow the same intuition.  Beyond the first perfectly-elastic
portion the country switches to producing just the middle good; on the next perfectly-elastic
portion it produces both that good and the skill-intensive good; and on the last downward-
sloping branch it produces just the skill-intensive good.  Note that because a different set of
products is made on each elastic part, each has different relative wages.
Our derivation of Figure 1 used an example with 3 goods and 2 factors.  But Figure 1 can
be re-interpreted for the more general case of J factors and I sectors.  With I sectors in the
output mix there are I zero-profit equations with J endogenously determined factor prices.  If
J£I, then national factor prices are completely determined by (1).  In this case national factor
supplies do not influence wages: only exogenous product prices and technology do.  If I<J
factor supplies do matter because prices and technology are not sufficient to determine wages.
Thus in Figure 1, the infinitely-elastic parts of RD are where J£I while the downward-sloping
parts are where I<J.10
Given this intuition for the shape of RD, it is important to emphasise that its position
depends on product prices and production technology.  Hence, changes in prices or technology
shift the position of the relevant parts of RD, and given labour supplies, wages change to
restore zero profits in all sectors.
To see the adjustment process formally, assume that over some time period an economy
produces the same set of I>J goods and therefore remains on a flat portion of RD.  Totally
differentiating the I zero profit conditions in (1) with respect to time gives (Leamer, 1998)11
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10Two final comments on Figure 1.  First, note that when the number of sectors S exceeds the number of factors, output
mixes are usually indeterminate.  That is, there is no unique optimal output mix that can fully employ all factors in a given
endowment.  Instead, the range of optimal outputs usually lies in an (S-I) dimensional space.  In our derivation of RD in the
text, for simplicity we focused on output mixes whose relation to the underlying endowments seems most intuitive.  Second,
the downward-sloping portions of RD assume flexible production technologies which allow substitutability among factors.  If
technology were Leontief these portions would become vertical.
11 This ignores second-order terms, see data appendix.10
where Dlogpit =[Dlogpit
G-SniiDlogpit
G] is the change in value added prices12, Vjit is the share of
factor  j in total costs in sector i at time t; and DlogTFPit is the growth in total-factor
productivity for sector i.  The final term in (2), Dlogwjt, is the change in the wage of factor j,
which is of course economy-wide since all factors are mobile across sectors.
Equation (2) shows how Dlogwjt responds to any changes in prices (Dlogpit) or in
technology (DlogTFPit) to restore zero profits in all sectors.  At initial factor prices, any
change in product prices or technology means zero profits no longer hold in one or more
sectors.  Hence producers try to expand output in now-profitable sectors and reduce output in
unprofitable sectors.  Relative labour demand increases for the factors employed relatively
intensively in expanding sectors and reduces for the factors intensive in the contracting
sectors.  To restore equilibrium, at fixed labour supply, relative wages must adjust in response
to the demand shifts until all profit opportunities are arbitraged away.
The key empirical implication of (2) is that the wage effects of changes in product prices
and technology tend to depend on their sector bias.  Any change which initially increases
profits in a particular sector tends to raise the economy-wide wage for factor(s) employed
relatively intensively in that sector.  The Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes how wages
tend to rise for factors employed intensively in sectors enjoying rising relative product prices.
The same intuition applies to technology: wages tend to rise for factors employed intensively
in sectors enjoying relatively large technology gains.13
In terms of figure 1, RD shifts up when price and/or TFP growth is concentrated in skill-
intensive sectors.  RD shifts down when this growth is concentrated in unskilled-intensive
sectors.  Assuming the economy remains on a flat portion of RD, (2) allows us to quantify
                                                
12 This nomenclature follows Leamer (1998), although strictly speaking Dlogpit is value-added prices multiplied by the share
of total value added in production costs.
13Wage effects are harder to determine if technology changes also induce product-price changes as well, but sector bias still
matters in this case in many circumstances (see Haskel and Slaughter, 1998).11
these wage effects of shifts in RD induced by sector-biased changes in prices and
technology.14
Equation (2) links technical change, prices and relative wages.  To use it further, we must
make some additional assumptions regarding exogeneity.  First, suppose that the UK is a
small open economy, i.e. changes in domestic prices are entirely due to international trade,
and suppose too that TFP growth is exogenous.  In (2), we can use data on prices and outputs
and inputs to construct Dlogpit, DlogTFPit and Vjit.  The term Dlogwjt, which is the change in
the economy-wide factor price required to maintain zero profits, is of course unknown.  To
determine technology’s effect on wages we estimate
Dlog =   
jJ
TFP V it jit jt it be
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where eit is an additive error term and the J coefficients bjt are parameters to be estimated.  A
positive bjt indicates that technical change was larger in sectors in which factor j constitutes a
larger share of costs, i.e., in sectors which employ factor j relatively intensively.  Our sector-
bias intuition suggests that the national wage for factor j should have risen in response to these
price changes.  Hence, we interpret each bjt as factor j's wage change "mandated" to restore
zero profits in all sectors in response to the sector bias of technical change.  We can then
compare our mandated wage changes with actual wage changes to determine what share of
actual changes are accounted for by technology.
For trade we estimate a similar equation given by
                                                
14 If the economy produces a range of goods such that it is on the downward sloping portion of RD, the zero profit
conditions in (2) still hold.  But (2) would not fully determine wage changes since factor supplies matter as well.  It would
clearly be of relevance to know the width of the flat and downward-sloping parts of the RD curve and the details of the
change in goods produced.  Theory predicts that switching product mixes (i.e. dropping production of unskilled-intensive
goods and undertaking production of skilled-intensive goods) as the economy moves from a flat section to a downward-
sloping section of RD depends on the interaction production technologies, world product prices and domestic endowments.
Empirically, there is very little empirical evidence on changes in product mix over countries or time.12
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where eit is an additive error term.  Each estimate gjt is the zero-profit-restoring change in
factor j's wage “mandated” by the sector bias of price changes.  We also can compare
mandated changes to actual wage changes to see what share of actual changes technology
accounts for.  Finally, adding together the bs and gs from (3) and (4) for each factor j gives the
net wage changes mandated by trade plus technology .15
By contrast, suppose now that prices and TFP are endogenous.  For this case we adopt a
two stage approach.  In the first stage we regress TFP and price changes each on a set of
underlying regressors, Zte and Zpr, which are assumed to drive TFP and price changes
respectively over some period t.  This can be written









where Spr and Ste are the two sets of underlying variables and each parameter in the vectors dte
and dpr gives the contribution of its affiliated structural variable to observed TFP and price
variation, respectively.
                                                
15Three further points on (3) and (4) are worth noting.  First, the error term in each equation captures, for example, zero
profits not holding exactly in all sectors.  Second, note that with our small-economy assumption TFP growth can affect factor
prices but not product prices.  Third, our mandated-wage regressions might appear odd because the exogenous variable is the
regressand rather than the regressor while the dependent variable of interest (factor-price changes) is estimated rather than the
regressand.  The most important reason a "standard" regression cannot be used is the dimensionality of the data prevents
inversion of the (J x I) regressor matrix formed by stacking all I industries in equations (3) or (4).  For example, our data used
below contain over 100 manufacturing industries but only three primary factors plus intermediate inputs.  With more
products than factors the regressor matrix is not square and thus cannot be inverted.13
In the second stage we regress the predicted values due to each underlying variable on
the factor cost shares:
$ db e te te it jit jt te it
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The share coefficients (bjt, te and gjt, pr) give the wage changes mandated by the sector bias of
each structural force working through either TFP or prices.  For example, if the first-stage
equation (5) indicates that increased trade contributes to DlogTFPit then second-stage equation
(7) tells how much trade has affected wages through its induced sector bias of changes in TFP.
In sum, we estimate the wage effects of trade and technology under two different
assumptions.  First we assume prices and technology are exogenous and estimate (3) and (4).
Second, we assume prices and technology are endogenous and estimate (5)-(8).
Before finishing the discussion of our HO framework, we contrast our single-stage price
regression (4) with the U.K. price regressions, cited in the introduction, which are of the form
Dlog =    / it pS U
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where (S/U)i is the skilled/unskilled employment ratio in industry i during the starting period.
Equation (9) is estimated with reference to HO trade theory, as in many of the initial product-
price studies for the U.S.  But (9) does not follow from the HO model as closely as (6) does,
so these earlier findings may not be as informative (see Slaughter, 1999).14
2b.  Other Issues Concerning the HO Model
To address some possible criticisms of the HO model, we note the following.  First, it its
important to stress the role of factor supplies.  FPI does not imply that wages are invariant to
factor supplies. As explained earlier, national factor supplies do help determine wage levels in
at least two cases.  First, when the country chooses a national output mix with fewer produced
goods than factors and second, even if FPI initially holds, when labour-supply shocks induce
the country to make a different set of products.  In our data analysis, for each decade we
assume both that FPI holds and that the U.K. product mix did not change.  In the absence of
information on changes in product mix, every previous mandated-wage study has made these
same assumptions.  In terms of Figure 1, they mean that we estimate trade and technology-
driven shifts up or down for a single flat portion of RD.  If our assumptions are correct, then
our mandated wage changes should match actual wage changes.  If the two do not match, one
possible reason will be that endowment changes moved the economy to a new part of RD.
We return to this issue in Section 4.
A second issue is the role of SBTC.  In (2), DlogTFPit embodies all kinds of technical
change, including SBTC.16  We consider all types of technical change, since any type of
technical progress increases sectoral profitability and thus induces wage changes.
Third, the factor price equalisation (FPE) theorem (Samuelson, 1948) predicts that each
factor receives the same wage world-wide.  It is important to stress we do not assume FPE or
impose it at any stage.  Our framework considers the production side of a single country.  FPE
requires at least one other country and restrictive assumptions about cross-country similarities
(such as identical production technologies) which we do not impose in any way.  Our
framework allows FPI, but this is a much less restrictive condition than FPE.
                                                
16 To see that DlnTFP growth embodies all types of technical progress, suppose Y=A´F(aS, bU) where Y is output, S
skilled labour, U unskilled labour, A is Hicks-Neutral TC, a is skill-biased TC and b is unskilled biased TC.  Taking logs and
differentiating with respect to time gives, where Dx denotes change in log x over time, DlnTFPºDy-VsDS-
VuDU=Da+VsDa+VuDb where Vs and Vu are cost shares in output and we have used the first-order conditions for S and U.15
The fourth point concerns interindustry wage differentials.  Our model assumes perfect
interindustry factor mobility such that each factor earns the same wage in all sectors.  A large
literature has documented sizeable interindustry wage differentials for workers with the same
measurable skills (see e.g. Katz and Summers, 1989).  Whether or not these differentials exist,
what matters here is whether they are stable over time.  Since we estimate mandated changes
in economy-wide wages, the issue is whether actual changes in industry wages are driven
mainly by economy-wide changes common to all sectors or by changes in the differentials
specific to each sector.  To examine this, Table 1 sets out the fraction of actual industry wage
changes accounted for by changes in industry-specific differentials for skilled and unskilled
labour over three decades.17
Table 1





Source: Authors’ calculations based on Oulton and O’Mahony data.  See data appendix.
As the table shows, changes in inter-industry wage differentials account for at most 11% of
total industry wage changes.  This is consistent with the evidence in Katz and Summers
(1989) and others that wage differentials are very stable over time.  Interindustry wage
differentials clearly exist in levels, but changes in industry wages are driven almost entirely by
changes in economy-wide wages.  Thus, we think that our mandated-wage analysis is of
considerable relevance (algebraically, wage differentials might be fixed effects in (1) that
disappear in (2)).
                                                
17 We calculate, for the skilled and unskilled, S[D((wsi ) - (ws))/(ws))] and S[D((wui ) - (wu))/(wu))] where ws and wu are
economy-wide averages and we sum over industries.  For more information on the data see below.16
Fifth, a related issue is imperfectly competitive product markets.  For sector bias to drive
relative wages we only require a systematic link from prices and technology to wages.  Perfect
competition delivers this link, but an alternative would be imperfect competition with a
constant price-cost mark-up.  Like wage differentials, this would change (1) but not (2): some
constant extranormal profit would be added to (1) (which might contribute to wage
differentials), but this would disappear in (2).  Even with imperfect competition, monopolistic
competition with entry would give zero equilibrium profits (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
Sixth, a nontraded sector can easily be incorporated into our framework.  If the number of
tradable goods at least equals the number of primary factors, national wages are still
determined by the zero-profit conditions of the tradable sectors only.  This means that
nontraded industries need not be included in the estimation.  Nontradables’ product prices are
endogenously determined by production technology in the nontraded sector and by wages.
Technical progress in nontradables does not affect wages; instead, it lowers nontraded prices.
Finally, our model does not have labour-market institutions, such as unions or centralised
wage setting, which might influence wages.  Empirically we do consider unions, but through
their effect on TFP growth.  Constructing an estimable general equilibrium model
incorporating these wage setting institutions is beyond the scope of this current paper. 18
3.  Data, Measurement and Econometrics
Here we discuss the essential features of the data; details are given in an appendix.  Our
main data are the U.K. manufacturing data collected by Oulton and O’Mahony (OO, 1994).19
OO constructed an industry-year panel, based mainly on the Census of Production, for around
                                                
18 For (partial equilibrium) evidence that unions do not seem very important in explaining U.K. wage inequality see Gosling
and Machin (1996).  It is worth contrasting the role of unionisation here to that usually considered in the literature.  Unions
are generally seen as narrowing wage inequality for (not well understood) institutional reasons or via unobserved sorting.
Our framework measures instead the contribution of unions to wage inequality via technical change.  For example, if unions
hold up technical change disproportionately in the skill-intensive sectors then they raise the relative profitability of the
unskill-intensive sectors.  This tends to lower wage inequality.  A reduction of union power could therefore raise wage
inequality by increasing TFP growth in the skill-intensive sectors.
19We are extremely grateful to Nicholas Oulton for providing us with these data and some unpublished data consistent with
published data.17
135 three-digit U.K. SIC manufacturing industries at roughly five-year intervals.20  This panel
contains information on prices and quantities of output, labour, capital and intermediates.
The labour data are divided into manual and non-manual employees, whom we call
unskilled and skilled workers, respectively.  Our measure of wage inequality is thus the non-
manual/manual wage premium in U.K. manufacturing.  This occupational measure is the only
skills measure consistently available (a) over a long time period (b) with congruent trade and
technology indicators, and (c) at a disaggregated level.  On average, non-manuals are more
educated than manuals (see Machin (1996) and Haskel and Heden (1998)), so these
occupation data do distinguish skill groups.21  Table 2 shows the fall and then rise of the U.K.
skill premium.  In addition the 1980s rise, the earlier fall also requires explanation.
Table 2







1954 603 410 1.47
1958 747 522 1.43
1963 927 659 1.41
1968 1,256 910 1.38
1973 2,077 1,565 1.33
1976 3,540 2,734 1.30
1979 5,215 4,030 1.29
1982 8,043 5,898 1.36
1986 11,241 7,958 1.41
Notes: Skilled and unskilled wages are manufacturing-wide average annual non-manual and manual
nominal earnings.
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on Oulton and O’Mahony data, see data appendix.
                                                
20 We dropped shipbuilding, vehicles, iron and steel and aerospace since they were (wholly or partly) publicly owned during
at least part of the sample period.  Our results were robust to their inclusion.  We lose a few industries in each decade due to
missing observations.
21 Gregory and Zissimos (1998) obtain very similar results to us for the 1980s using a different data set with skill defined by
education levels.18
We calculated DlogTFPit using our three primary factors (both labour types and capital)
and intermediate inputs.22  We calculated Dlogpit, changes in value-added prices, as defined
earlier.  Both DlogTFPit and Dlogpit measure decade changes, with endpoints dictated by data
availability.23.  Following Feenstra and Hanson (1998), cost shares in gross output, Vjit, are
averages between the first and last years of each decade.  We assumed that payments to capital
equal the value of gross output less the total wage bill and input costs; we do not think we
have good enough data to define capital’s payments independently.




Change in skilled wage 0.51 1.41 0.77































Notes: Cells report employment-weighted means, with standard deviations in parentheses.  Wages are
manufacturing-wide wages and so have no standard deviation.  Prices are value-added prices as defined in the
text.  Changes are calculated as log changes over 1958-68, 1968-79, and 1979-86.  TFP is calculated using
manufacturing-wide wages.  See data appendix for details.
Source: Author’s calculations from OO data.
                                                
22In the productivity literature, errors in measuring DlogTFPit are a major concern.  We note that the OO data also contain a
TFP series constructed using labour and capital disaggregated much more finely; the sample correlation between the two TFP
measures was 0.95.  We also note that in our analysis DlogTFPit is used as a regressand, not a regressor, so we do not face the
problem of estimation bias due to measurement error.
23 The 1960s change is 1958-68, the 1970s is 1968-79 and the 1980s is 1979-86.19
Table 3a shows the absolute wage changes underlying the inequality changes in Table 2.
During the high-inflation 1970s wage and price growth were higher while TFP growth was
slower; in addition, the standard deviation of price and TFP growth was larger.  Capital’s
average cost share remains roughly constant while the unskilled share falls.  There is little
change in the standard deviation of any of the shares.
With three factors, in our one-stage analysis the estimating equation for technology is
Dlog =    TFP V V V it s sit u uit k kit it b b b e +++ (3¢)
and for prices is
Dlog =    pV V V it s sit u uit k kit it g g g e +++ (4¢)
where we estimate (3¢) and (4¢) separately for each decade.
Turning to the two stage approach, our selection of the determinants of DlogTFPit follows
the extensive U.K. productivity literature which stresses the role of financial, labour, and
product markets (e.g., Haskel (1991), Metcalf (1989), and Nickell (1996)).  Unfortunately we
do not have satisfactory industry-year financial-market data.  For labour markets we use
industry union density, (denoted UNIONgt where g denotes that the variable is available at
two-digit level24), and its decade change (DUNIONgt).  In standard effort bargain models
DUNIONgt reduces DlogTFPit, but raises it in “voice” models.  UNIONgt (in levels) might also
affect DlogTFPit through incentives to learn or to introduce new work practices.  Our product-
market regressor is the share of domestic sales (less imports) accounted for by the five largest
firms, CONCit, available at the three-digit level.
                                                
24 Unfortunately the only data available over a cross-section and time series is a two-digit measure, but we did enter a three-
digit cross-sectional measure of union coverage in 1973 as a partial check and get similar results to the levels data.20
Beyond these commonly used determinants of DlogTFPit, we consider three others as well.
First, it is important to control for cross-sectional differences in DlogTFPit caused by different
technical opportunities in different sectors (which may be correlated with CONC and
UNION).  To do this we use (two-digit) data on average innovations produced per industry
(INNOVgt).  As Geroski, Machin, and van Reenen (1993) point out, innovation counts have
the attractive property of being an output of the research process rather than an input (such as
R&D expenditures) and are therefore likely to be helpful indicators of DlogTFPit.25  Second,
for the 1980s we also use a measure of changes in computerisation (DCOMPUTERgt).  This is
derived from a PSI survey of computerisation and gives the change in the proportion of firms
in the (two-digit) industry using computers.  We include this variable in light of research
suggesting that computers induce SBTC.  Finally, to test the hypothesis that international
competition induces technical change we include as regressors decade changes in domestic
gross-output product prices relative to import prices.  To allow different competitive effects
from different countries we try three different source-country groups:  the OECD, newly
industrialised countries (NICs), and the nonOECD rest of the world.  Thus, we create three
regressors Dlog(pUK/pOECD)gt, D log(pUK/pNonOECD)gt and Dlog(pUK/pNICs)gt.  These regressors are
available at the two-digit level.
We model Dlogpit as depending on changes in prices of competing imports.  There is well-
documented evidence of persistent price differentials between UK and foreign traded goods
(see, e.g., MMC 1984 (compact discs) and Verboven 1996 (automobiles)) that in part reflect
trade barriers.  Unfortunately, lack of data prevents us from including trade barriers in our
analysis.  Accordingly, our estimating equation for prices regresses Dlogpit on industry
changes in U.K. import prices.  Using the same country groupings as above we construct
changes in import prices DlogpOECD,gt,  DlogpNonOECD,gt,  DlogpNIC,gt.26
                                                
25These survey data might be regarded as subjective and/or an incorrect measure of the total number of innovations by
industry.  For our purposes, however, we need only that these data capture the cross-sectional variation in technical
propensity, e.g., how much more innovative the computer sector is than timber.
26 We are very grateful to Bob Anderton for providing us with these data.21












































Change in computer intensity - 26.6
(2.84)
Notes: Cells report employment-weighted means, with standard deviations in parentheses.  Changes are
calculated as log changes between the years indicated.  Levels terms here and in the regressions are for the first
year of the relevant decade. See data appendix for details.
As the table shows, innovations were fairly constant over the period whilst union density rose
in the 1970s and fell in the 1980s.  Non-OECD prices fell strongly in the 1970s relative to
OECD prices, and in the 1980s NICs prices also fell.
Turning to our estimating equations, our DlogTFPit regression is
DD
D
log    +   +  +
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where the final term is the group of relative foreign price terms.  We have data on the
regressors from 1973 onwards, so we estimate (5¢) pooling over the two cross-sections 1973-
79 and 1979-86 and adding a time dummy; fixed effects were insignificant.  For the second
stage, as in (7), we take the fitted values of each regressor from (5¢) and regress them on the
three cost shares (the regressors in (3¢)).  We do this second stage separately for 1973-79 and
1979-86.
Our estimating equation for Dlogpit is
DD D D log   log   + log + log     + it , ,  ,  pp p p OECD gt NonOECD gt NIC gt it = m m m e 12 3 (6¢)
where we again pool over the cross-sections 1973-79 and 1979-86 and add a time dummy and
fixed effects.  In the second stage, as in (8), we take the fitted values of each regressor from
(6¢) and regress them on cost shares separately for 1973-79 and 1979-86. 27
Concerning the estimation of (3¢)-(6¢) the following points are worth noting.  First, we
prefer ten-year differences to five-year differences (which we could construct) because the
decade end points generally correspond with turning points in the skill premium.  In addition,
these endpoints were at roughly similar points in the business cycle, so cost shares should not
be too contaminated by labour hoarding.  Second, we estimated all our equations by WLS (the
panel regressions (5¢) and (6¢) used LSDV) with sector employment averaged over the decade
as weights (unweighted results were very similar).  Since the cost shares appear as regressors
and are also in DlogTFPit, we re-estimated (3¢) and (4¢) and the second stage of (5¢) and (6¢)
using IV with 1958 cost shares as instruments; we obtained almost identical results.  Finally,
in (7) and (8) the regressands are generated regressors from (5¢) and (6¢), and so we correct our
coefficient standard errors in (7) and (8) using the method in Feenstra and Hanson (1998).
                                                
27 We estimated equations (5¢) and (6¢) separately for each decade but the pooling restrictions were accepted.  For brevity,
we report just the pooled results.23
4  Empirical Results
4a.  Simple Price Regressions
Table 4 reports estimates of (9).
Table 4





(Ns/Nu)i, t-1 -0.16 0.09 0.18
(2.82) (0.97) (4.32)
 Adj. R2 0.057 -0.005 0.13
# obs 116 121 123
Notes: Each column reports estimation of equation (9) for a different decade.  For precise years, see Table 3.
Equations weighted by average-period employment.  Absolute t statistics in parentheses.
These regressions suggest that in the 1960s relative prices rose for the unskilled-intensive
sectors.  This would tend to lower wage inequality, as indeed happened.  There is no clear
shift in relative prices during the 1970s.  In the 1980s price rises were concentrated in the
skill-intensive sectors.  This would tend to raise inequality, as indeed happened.  Our 1980s
results are qualitatively similar to Neven and Wyplosz (1996), who find a positive yet
insignificant relationship (using gross-output prices).  Desjonqueres, et al, (1997) find no
significant relation for a sample of 16 sectors.  Overall, Table 4 suggests that price changes
played a significant role in wage changes during the 1960s and 1980s but not during the
1970s.  To quantify the link from prices to wages, however, our mandated-wage analysis is
required.
4b.  One-Stage Mandated-Wage Regressions
Table 5 reports results for equations (3¢) and (4¢).24
Table 5
One-Stage Mandated-Wage Regressions: Estimates of (3¢) and (4¢)
(dependent variables: Dlogpit  and DlogTFPit for each indicated decade)
1960s 1970s 1980s






































2  0.04  0.08  0.18  0.05  0.30  0.16
Number of Obs.  116  116  121  121  123  123
Mandated % rise













Notes:  Each column reports estimation results for a specification of either equation (3¢) or (4¢).  Absolute t
statistics in parentheses.  Mandated inequality changes add the coefficients on Vsi and Vui in each column.  The
p value for each mandated change shows the probability of accepting the hypothesis that the coefficient on Vsi
equals the coefficient on Vui.
To read this table consider the first column which reports coefficient estimates for the
regressors  Vsi,  Vui, and Vki from (4¢) for 1958-68.  The coefficient on Vsi, -0.20, indicates that
the sector bias of 1960’s price changes mandated a fall in the skilled wage of 20% to maintain
zero profits in all sectors.  Similarly, the mandated change in the unskilled wage was a rise of
27% and for capital a rise of 7%.  Below these coefficient estimates we report the mandated
change in the skill premium, -47% (equal to -0.20 - 0.27), and its p value (0.20) indicating
rejection of the null of zero mandated change in inequality at only the 80% significance.25
Looking over all decades, the sector bias of price changes mandated an insignificant
decline in inequality during the 1960s, an insignificant rise in inequality during the 1970s, and
a significant rise in inequality during the 1980s.  The 1980s results are the strongest in terms
of significance.  We regard these 1980s results to be particularly important: this is the first
paper in the U.K. literature to find significant price effects during the 1980s (Gregory and
Zissimoss, 1998 find a similar result).  Turning to the technology regressions, the sector bias
of TFP growth mandated a significant rise in inequality during the 1960s, a further
insignificant  rise during the 1970s, and an insignificant decline in inequality during the 1980s.
This suggests that technology, measured as TFP growth, did not contribute to wage inequality
in the 1980s.
These results for prices and TFP individually are of interest, but we also want to know
their combined wage effects.  By comparing the combined “mandated” wage changes with
actual changes, we can gauge how well our HO framework performs.  Table 6 presents the net
mandated wage changes and the actual wage changes.
Table 6
Net Mandated and Actual Wage Changes
(net mandated changes calculated from addition across rows for each decade in table 5)
1960s 1970s 1980s
Dws mandated 0.61 0.98 1.39 1.37 1.90 2.44 0.63 0.97 1.32
Dws actual 0.51 1.41 0.77
Dwu mandated 0.14 0.27 0.41 0.47 0.70 0.93 0.17 0.32 0.48
Dwu actual 0.57 1.51 0.68
D(ws –wu)  mandated 0.29 0.70 1.41 0.58 1.20 1.83 0.24 0.65 1.04
D(ws –wu)  actual -0.06 -0.10 0.11
Notes: Italicized numbers adjacent to each mandated change are 95% confidence intervals for that change.
Looking at the top left-hand cell, the 1960s net mandated wage increase was 98% for
skilled labour (this equals -20% + 118% from Table 5), with a 95% confidence interval of26
61% to 139%.  This compares with an actual rise of 51% over the period.   The rest of Table 5
reads analogously.
So how well does our HO model perform?  Our mandated wage changes for skilled labour
are reasonably accurate: within sampling error for the 1970s and 1980s and just outside for the
1960s.  For unskilled labour we consistently underpredict the actual wage rise.  Because of
this underprediction, in all decades our mandated inequality changes exceed actual inequality
changes.  There are at least two possible reasons for this underprediction.  First, our model
does not allow unions to raise wages above that consistent with the pressure of labour market
competition from workers in other industries.  To the extent that unions actually do this, and
do this primarily for the less-skilled, one would expect underprediction.  Second, our analysis
assumes for each decade that any labour-supply shifts induce only Rybczynski product-mix
effects.  Since the 1960s the relative number of unskilled workers has declined.  If these
supply shifts have been large enough to have both output-mix and wage effects, they likely
have raised less-skilled wages.
4c.  Two-Stage Mandated-Wage Regressions
Table 7 reports results for our stage-one estimation of (5¢) explaining TFP growth.27
Table 7
First-Stage TFP Growth Regressions: Estimates of (5¢)
(dependent variable: DlnTFPit)
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2 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.31
Number of Obs. 233 233 233 116
Notes: Absolute t statistics in parentheses.  Coefficients on INNOVgt, UNIONgt, DUNIONgt, and DCOMPUTERgt
are actual coefficients multiplied by 1000.  Subscript g indicates the variable available at 2 digit level.  Columns
(1)-(3) pool differences for 1973-79 and 1979-86 and include a time dummy (fixed effects were insignificant).
Column (4) is for 1979-86.
Column (1) of Table 7 reports the estimation of (5¢) using just the labour and product-market
variables.  All four regressors are significant and have signs consistent with previous work.  In
column (2) we add the three import-price regressors.  The basic regressors are still significant,
but only falls in relative NIC import prices significantly raise DlogTFPit.  Column (3) includes
only relative NIC import and finds the same effect as in column (2).  Finally, in column (4) we
add computerisation but find an insignificantly positive link with DlogTFPit.28
Table 8 reports the stage-two estimation results for equation (7) for each of the
determinants of DlogTFPit in Table 7.
Table 8
Second-Stage Mandated Regressions for Explanatory Variables of DlnTFP: estimates of (7)
(dependent variable: predicted DlnTFPit from table 7 due to row regressor)
1970s 1980s
Regressor: Innov CONC Union DUnion DpUK/
pNICs





































































Note: Each column reports estimation results for a specification of equation (7) using a different underlying
variable multiplied by its coefficient estimate from Table 7.  Number of observations are 1973-79=117, 1979-
86=121. Number in brackets under Vs and Vu estimates are absolute t statistics corrected for generated regressors,
see text.  NA denotes cannot calculate standard error due to the generated regressors procedure.  Numbers in
brackets in final row are absolute t statistics for hypothesis that the rise in inequality is zero.  Vk not reported for
brevity.
For each underlying variable in each decade we report the mandated change in skilled wages,
unskilled wages, and inequality.  There are three significant results from Table 8.  First,
innovations mandated significant rises in inequality over both decades.  The intuition is that in
both decades the positive effect of innovations on DlogTFPit was concentrated in skill-
intensive sectors and hence innovations raised inequality.  Second, changes in unionisation
mandated a significant rise in inequality during the 1980s.  The intuition is that the fall in
unionisation during the 1980s was concentrated in skill-intensive sectors.  This raised
DlogTFPit in these sectors (from Table 7) and so raised inequality.  Third, Dlog(pUK/pNIC)
mandated a significant rise in inequality during the 1970s but no significant change during the
1980s.  This is somewhat mixed support for the hypothesis that trade-induced TFP growth has29
raised inequality.  Beyond these main results, our other forces had insignificant effects on
inequality.
Two other points are worth noting.  First, although Table 8 indicates that the sector bias of
innovations’ effect on DlogTFPit significantly raised inequality during the 1970s and 1980s,
Table 5 indicates for these decades that overall DlogTFPit had no significant effect on
inequality.  These results suggest that other determinants of DlogTFPit outweighed the sector
bias of innovations.  Second, our results can help think about the consequences of government
policy.  Policies which influence the determinants of DlogTFPit can contribute to wage
changes, e.g., legislation that reduces union power or R&D subsidies which increase
innovations.  Policies aimed at reducing inequality might need to consider its sectoral effects.
Turning to the price regressions, Table 9 reports stage-one estimates of (6¢).
Table 9













Number of Obs 256 256
Notes: Both columns pool differences for both 1973-79 and 1979-86 and include a constant, time dummy and
fixed effects.  Absolute t statistics in brackets.  Coefficients on Vk not reported.
Column (1) reports results using all three import-price regressors.  As in Table 7, only the NIC
import prices have a significant effect: NIC import-price changes are significantly correlated
with changes in Dlogpit.  Column (2) omits the other prices and finds the same effect.30
Table 10 reports the stage-two estimation results of equation (8) using just NIC import
prices as the driving force.
Table 10
Second-Stage Mandated Wage Regressions for Explanatory Variables of Dlogp: Estimates of (8)















Note: Each column reports estimation results for a specification of equation (8) using the a different underlying
variable multiplied by its coefficient estimate from Table 9.  Number of observations are 1973-79=117, 1979-
86=121. Number in brackets under Vs and Vu estimates are absolute t statistics corrected for generated regressors,
see text.  NA denotes cannot calculate standard error due to the generated regressors procedure.  Numbers in
brackets in final row are t statistics for hypothesis that the rise in inequality is zero.  Vk not reported for brevity.
This table is structured like Table 8, and its message is that the sector bias of import-price
changes working through Dlogpit mandated a significant decline in inequality during the 1970s
but an insignificant rise during the 1980s.  Thus, we find some evidence for the 1970s that
"trade mattered" through the sector-bias of import-price pressures on domestic prices, but not
for the key decade of the 1980s.
4d.  Robustness Checks and Discussion of Empirical Results
We carried out a number of robustness checks on the results.  First, to explore the role of
technical change in inducing price changes, we added DlogTFPit as a regressor in the stage-
one price regression (6¢) and calculated its implied sector bias in the second stage.  Although it
was highly significant in explaining prices (coefficient =-.60, t =-11.50) it mandated an
insignificant rise in wage inequality in both decades (t=0.27 for the 1970s and 1.55 for the31
1980s).  This suggests that DlogTFPit did not have significant effects on wage inequality
through price changes.
Second, since our data end in 1986 we re-examined the 1980s using a different Census-
based data set covering 1980-89 at the three-digit SIC level.28  We obtained similar results to
those above.  For the TFP growth equation the estimates (t statistics) on Vs and Vu were 0.22
(0.41) and 0.29 (1.47), which mandates an insignificant fall in inequality (p=0.92).  For the
price equation, the estimates (t statistics) on Vs and Vu were 0.77 (1.40) and 0.08 (0.40); these
mandated rising wage inequality (although insignificantly so, p =0.29).29
We also note that our 1980s results are extremely similar to Gregory and Zissimoss
(1998).  They estimate mandated wage equations for 1979-90 using input-output tables to
construct sectors and educational categories to define skills.  Like us, they also find that
technical change mandated no significant increase in inequality whilst price changes mandated
a significant rise.  This suggests that our results are robust to our non-manual/manual skills
measure.
Haskel and Slaughter (1998) find evidence that SBTC mandated declining U.K. inequality
during the 1970s and then rising inequality during the 1980s.  The different mandated wage
changes for SBTC and DlogTFPit highlight the fact that any observed change in TFP is
consistent with many different combinations of factor-biased and factor-neutral technical
change.  Our SBTC and TFP results suggest that unskilled-biased technical change and/or
factor-neutral technical change had different sector biases from SBTC, but more research
would be needed to establish this conjecture.30
                                                
28 Because of the major change in SIC codes in 1980, this check addresses both the time span of the 1980s and the concern
about measurement error in the OO data introduced by this classification change.
29 The actual wage change for the skilled is 0.83 which is within the confidence intervals for the net mandated wage change
for the skilled is (0.99, 95% confidence intervals 0.68 and 1.31) and for the unskilled the actual change in 0.70 with net
mandated 0.36 (0.25, 0.50).  It is worth noting that the sector bias of prices mandates a significant rise in inequality 1980-88.
Hence over the bulk of the 1980s price changes mandated significant rises in wage inequality.
30 Desjonques et al (1998) regress DlogTFPit for 16 sectors on (S/U) and find no significant relation.32
For the United States, Feenstra and Hanson (1998) find that computerisation mandated
rising inequality during the 1980s.  We do not find any clear wage effect from computers, but
we have a much coarser measure than they do.  Leamer (1998), reports that U.S. TFP growth
mandated rising inequality during the 1960s, 1970s and (less strongly) the 1980s, while price
changes mandated rising inequality during the 1970s.
Finally, we should mention that the only regressors in our Dlogpit regressions were foreign
prices, time dummies and fixed effects.  The low R
2 in these regressions suggests they by no
means completely explain domestic prices.  In future work, we hope to include other trade-
related forces such as changes trade barriers.
5.  Conclusions
We have attempted to estimate the effects of trade and technology on U.K. wage inequality.
To meet the problems in the existing literature we have proposed and implemented a method
that (a) calculates the sector bias of prices and technical change, and (b) calculates the parts of
prices and technical change due to foreign competition and/or other forces and the
contribution of each of these forces to wage inequality.
Our method is based on the production side of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory.  It estimates
the wage changes “mandated” by changes in prices and TFP, i.e., the wage changes consistent
with competitive conditions in the economy.  We have a number of findings, but an important
result concerning the 1980s was that changes in prices were the major force behind the rise in
inequality in the 1980s, not TFP.  This result differs from other papers which have not looked
at the sector bias of prices and technical change in line with HO underlying theory.
Our results still leave a number of questions unanswered that may provide the basis for
future work.  First, we have found only a weak link between domestic price changes and
international price changes.  Without better measures of trade barriers, the extent to which we
can ascribe changes in domestic prices as due to some aspect of international trade is still an
open question.  Second, although our model explains skilled wage changes quite well, we tend
to underpredict wage increases of less-skilled workers.  This suggests that we need to account
better for labour-market institutions and/or the role of supply changes.33
Data Appendix
Measurement of technology and prices
Writing out our equations explicitly with our 4 factors of production, Ns, Nu, K and M which are skilled,
unskilled labour, capital and materials, TFP is constructed as
  log =   logY - ( V )+ ( V )+ ( V )
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Equation (2) is derived for infinitesimal changes.  With discrete changes an extra term appears
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Inserting the extra term into (3) and (4) an re-estimating gives very similar answers to those reported in table 5.
Data from Oulton and O’Mahony (1994)
Vm is the share of intermediate inputs in nominal gross output.  Ns and Nu are “administrative, technical and
clerical workers” (skilled) and “others”, i.e. operatives (unskilled).  This corresponds roughly to the US non-
production/production split.  Vs and Vu are the shares in gross nominal output of each labour group, calculated
using the economy-wide skilled and unskilled wage (defined as the cross-sectional average skilled and unskilled
wage) times I divided by PY.  All shares are average shares by industry over the decade.  Vk is calculated as (1-
Vs-Vu-Vm) in order that the shares add up to one.  To be consistent, K is calculated as Vk*(PY)/pk where pk is the
capital price deflator from OO.  We drop industries from the OO data set outside of manufacturing and those
publicly owned for some or all of the period [SIC code and industry: 370 (Shipbuilding), 381 (Motor vehicles),
383 (Aerospace) and 311 (Iron & Steel)].  We do not use OO’s TFP data but construct our own for consistency
using the formula above; the correlation between the two measures is 0.95.
Other Data
CONC is the five firm concentration ratio, from the Census of Production, various issues.  It is multiplied by 1
minus the import penetration ratio (imports/(sales+imports-exports)) with these data from the Census of
Production Quarterly Reports.  Industries with penetration ratios above 1 were dropped.  These are all 3 digit
data.
UNION is a two digit measure of union density constructed originally by Bain and Price and updated by Small
(1994).
INNOV is a count of significant innovations produced in the sector i, from a survey conducted by the Science
Policy Research Unit , for further details see Robson and Townsend (1984) and Geroski et al, (1993).  Steve
Machin kindly supplied these data.  The data was converted to a two digit measure.
Foreign price data are unit value indices of goods supplied to domestic industries by country of origin.  These
data are on the ISIC basis but there is no official conversion method to UK 1968 SIC basis (which is the OO
data).  We therefore converted these data to a 2 digit 1968 basis by using the official link to the 1980 UK SIC
and then linking the 2 digit 1980 UK SIC to the 2 digit 1968 SIC.  We are very grateful to Bob Anderton of the
National Institute for kindly supplying us with these data.
DCOMPUTER is the change in industry computer intensity derived from a PSI stratified survey of the percentage
of establishments replying yes to the question "are you at present using the new microelectronics technology in
your production process?" PSI publish average use for 10 industries, averaging over sampled establishments, and
1980s difference is computed using changes 1982-87.  See Haskel and Heden (1998) for details.34
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